

ER's First Argument

1. Philosophers and participants both have at their disposal all the conceptual and epistemic resources required for forming correct epistemic intuitions in ideal circumstances.
2. Philosophers, in ideal circumstances, have epistemic intuition A about a certain case.
3. Participants, in equally ideal circumstances, have epistemic intuition B about the same case.
4. A and B are inconsistent.
5. If A and B are inconsistent while being epistemically on a par, neither A nor B is justified.
6. If a mental state is not justified, it cannot function as justifying evidence for further claims, beliefs, and theories.
7. Therefore, A is not evidence for a philosophical theory (neither is B).

1

ER's Second Argument

1. Philosophers and participants both have at their disposal all the conceptual and epistemic resources required for forming correct epistemic intuitions in ideal circumstances.
2. The processes that participants exercise in forming epistemic intuitions are systematically unstable or unreliable, even when they are exercised in ideal circumstances.
3. The processes that form epistemic intuition are generally unstable or unreliable, even though they are exercised in ideal circumstances.
4. Mental states formed by unreliable process are not justified.
5. If a mental state is not justified, it cannot function as justifying evidence for further claims, beliefs, and theories.
6. Therefore, epistemic intuitions in general are not evidence for a philosophical theory.

2

List of Criteria for Evaluating Intuition

- a. Objective Norms
- b. Disagreements between Subjects
- c. Using a Bad Cue
- d. Missing a Good Cue
- e. Peer Judgement
- f. Speed
- g. Adjustment
- h. Natural Environment
- i. Kind Environment
- j. Representation of the Problem Situation

3

Two Differences between HB and NDM

| HB | NDM |
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| <p>the Context of Justification: people are expected to provide a final answer to some specific question or stimulus.</p> <p>cf. Hogarth (2001)</p> | <p>the Context of Discovery: people diagnose the facing situation or problem in light of past experience and make a hypothesis to handle or explain it.</p> |
| <p>The Input-Output Orientation: is concerned with the intuition-<i>qua</i>-heuristic process, i.e., the process whose input is a cue for running simplifying heuristics.</p> <p>cf. Lipshitz et al. (2001)</p> | <p>The Process Orientation: is concerned with the intuition process whose input is mostly provided by knowledge stored in long-term memory that has been acquired from specific experience <i>via</i> implicit learning.</p> |

4