ANALYSIS OF THE NYAYABHUSANA
(p.46,l.13 - p.58,l.12 ; p.104,l.6 - p.154,l.20 ;
p.171,l.11 - p.173,l.8 ; p.176,l.11 - p.187,l.6)
CHAPTER 1
$B!!!!(BBhasarvajna's Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Pramana
(the Means of Cognition) (---p.46,l.13 - p.58,1.12---)
I. The Buddhist Sautrantikas' theory of pramana(the means of cognition) and
Bhasarvajna's refutation [46.13-49.14]
I.1. The theory of pramana of the Sautrantikas (PVin I 78.16 - 80.17) [46.13-47.12]
I.2. Bhasarvajna's refutation [47.14-49.14]
II. Discussion on the Buddhist doctrine of nondifferentiation between pramana
and pramanaphala [49.14 - 54.13]
II.1. The Sautrantika doctrine of pramana and pramanaphala(the resulting cognition)
(PVin I 80.18 - 27) [49.14 - 19]
II.2. Bhasarvajna's refutation [50.01 - 54.13]]
II.2.1. Instrument (e.g. an ax) is different from its effect (e.g. action of
cutting). [50.01 - 05]
II.2.2. Refutation of the expression of "savyaparam iva"(as if having functions)
[50.05 - 19]
II.2.3. Refutation of the view of savyapara(having functions) and ksanikavada
(the doctrine of momentariness) [50.20 - 51.25]
II.2.4. An action of cutting can not be an instrument. [52.01 - 05]
II.2.5. Refutation of the view of vyavastha-vyavasthapaka-relation(the relation
of the determinant and the determinable) [52.06-16]
II.2.6. Refutation of the view that vyavastha-vyavasthapaka-relation is established
by similarity. [52.17 - 53.07]
II.2.7. Rejection of arthakarata(images of objects) in knowledge[53.08 - 54.13]
II.2.8. Discussion on avisamvaditva(non-disagreement with experience)[54.13 - 56.07]
II.2.8.1. The Buddhists (Sautrantikas) maintain that pramana requires avisamvaditva.
[54.13 - 55.02]
II.2.8.2. Bhasarvajna's refutation [55.02 - 56.07]
II.2.8.2.1. The Buddhist assertion of anumana(inference) rejected [55.02 - 15]
II.2.8.2.2. The Buddhist ksanikavada and avisamvaditva can not be compatible.
[55.15 - 56.07]
II.2.8.2.3. The pramana which belongs to cognition and the arthakara which does not
belongs to it can not be identified.[56.08-57.05]
II.3. Discussion on the Buddhist Vijnaptimatravada[57.05 - 58.12]
II.3.1. The Vijnaptimatravadins maintain that an object is ultimately not existent
and that knowledge is indivisible. [57.05 - 09]
II.3.2. Bhasarvajna refutes the Buddhist Vijnaptimatravada (PVin I 100.14 - 24),
arguing that even "the ultimately true cognition" can not be proved. [57.10 - 58.12]
CHAPTER 2
Bhasarvajna's Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Vijnaptima
trata (---p.104,l.6 - p.154,l.20---)
I. The Buddhist doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata [104.06-109.25]
I.1. Disapproving of the realistic views [104.06-107.03]
I.1.1. Denial of 'avayavin'(the whole) theory of the Naiyayikas [104.08-106.06]
I.1.1.1. Dharmakirti's arguments [104.08-16]
I.1.1.1.1. Moving parts and unmoving parts(kampakampa)--PVin I 84,18-22[104.08-10]
I.1.1.1.2. Covered parts and uncovered parts(avarananavarana)--PVin I 84,22-86,05 [104.10-15]
I.1.1.1.3. Red-colored parts and not-red-colored parts(raktarakta)--PVin I 86,6-9 [104.15-16]
I.1.1.2. The Madhyamika's arguments[104.16-106.02]
I.1.1.2.1. Impossibility of existence(vrttyanupapatti)[104.16-106.02]
1. The parts(avayavas) can not exist in the whole(avayavin).[104.16-105.05]
2. The whole can not exist in the parts.[105.06-106.02]
I.1.1.2.2. Being analysed by conception(buddhyavivecana)[106.03-05]
1. The whole is a quality(dharma) of the parts.[106.05]
I.1.1.2.3. Conclusion[106.05-06]
I.1.2. Denial of the theory of accumulating atoms[106.06-10]
I.1.3. Denial of the atom itself[106.11-107.03]
I.2. The Vijnaptimatravadin's theory of knowledge [107.03-109.25]
I.2.1. Self-cognition(svasamvedana)--PVin I k.38[107.03-07]
I.2.2. Nondifferentiation between cognition and object [107.08-109.08]
I.2.2.1. sahopalambhaniyama(the necessity of being perceived together)[107.08-108.14]
I.2.2.1.1. PVin I k.55ab [107.08-108.03]
I.2.2.1.2. PVin I k.55cd [108.04-14]
1. PVin I 96,8-17 [108.04-09]
2. PVin I 96,23-98,5 [108.10-14]
I.2.2.2. The cognition arises from itself. [108.15-109.08]
I.2.2.2.1. The external objects have nothing to do with the occurrence of cognition.[108.15-19]
1. Examination of the Buddhist sakarajnanavada(the doctrine maintaining that
knowledge is always endowed with images) [108.20-21]
2. Examination of the Naiyayika nirakarajnanavada(the doctrine maintaining that
knowledge is without images) [108.21-109.04]
I.2.2.2.2. Reconfirmation of the above fact--PV,pratyaksa,k.432 [109.05-08]
I.2.3. The ultimate standpoint of the Vijnaptimatravadins [109.08-25]
I.2.3.1. Questions regarding the images in knowledge [109.08-10]
I.2.3.2. The ultimate truth --PV,pratyaksa,kk.330cd-332ab(=PVin I kk.39-40)-- [109.10-25]
II. Bhasarvajna's refutation [109.27-154.20]
II.1. Refutation of I.1.(Disaproving of the realistic views) [109.27-132.09]
II.1.1. Refutation of I.1.1.(Denial of the avayavin theory) [109.27-130.20]
II.1.1.1. Refutation of I.1.1.1.(Dharmakirti's arguments) [109.27-123.06]
II.1.1.1.1. Refutation of kampakampa [109.27-111.16]
1. From the logical standpoint [109.27-110.11]
1.1. svatantranumana(independent inference) [109.27-110.04]
1.2. prasanganumana(hypothetical destructive inference) [110.04-11]
1.2.1. The pervasion(vyapti) is not established. [110.04]
1.2.2. The fallacious probans whose locus is unreal(asrayasiddha)[110.05-08]
1.2.3. Another interpretation [110.08-11]
2. From the ontological standpoint [110.12-111.16]
2.1. The avayavin is an independent reality [110.12-17]
2.2. The case that half the parts are moving(ardhavayavacalanakale)[110.17-111.05]
2.3. Movement is a partial existence (calanasya pradesavrttitvam) [111.06-16]
II.1.1.1.2. Refutation of avarananavarana [111.16-23]
II.1.1.1.3. Refutation of raktarakta [111.24-123.06]
1. Distinction between the color of the avayavin and that of the avayavas [111.24-25]
2. pradesavrtti(partial existence) [111.25-112.11]
3. The color of the avayavin [112.13-123.06]
3.1. rupamatra(the mere color) [112.13-113.04]
3.2. citrarupa(the variegated color)[113.04-123.06]
3.2.1. Establishment by pratyaksa(perception) [113.04-10]
3.2.2. Establishment by anumana(inference) [113.10-15]
3.2.3. Particular case [113.15-20]
3.2.4. What is an object of the variegated manifestation(citrapratibhasa)? [113.21-123.06]
3.2.4.1. The view that the object is a part distinct from atoms [114.01]
3.2.4.2. The view that the object is atoms, followed by Bhasarvajna's refutation [114.02-12]
a. Sarvastivadins [114.02-05]
$B!!!!(Bb. Sautrantikas [114.06-12]
3.2.4.3. The Sautrantika view that the object is accumulating atoms, followed
by Bhasarvajna's refutation [114.12-24]
3.2.4.4. The Vijnaptimatravada view that the object is the variegated images
in knowledge, followed by Bhasarvajna's refutation [115.01-123.06]
a. The citradvaita theory of the Vijnaptimatravadins [115.18-116.05]
b. Bhasarvajna's refutation [116.07-123.06]
$B!!(B b.a. Rejection of the advaita theory in general [116.07-09]
b.b. Citradvaita is identical with brahmadvaita of the Vedantins.[116.09-120.23]
b.b.a. Prajnakaragupta's refutation [117.02-118.04]
b.b.b. Bhasarvajna's reply [118.05-13]
b.b.c. The Vijnaptimatravada advaita theory, followed by Bhasarvajna's refutation [118.13-119.17]
b.c. Inconsistency of citradvaita with the svasamvedana theory [119.19-120.23]
b.d. Refutation of Prajnakaragupta's citradvaita theory --asakyavivecana-- [121.01-20]
$B!!(B b.d.a. Refutation of I.1.1.2.2. [121.21-122.20]
b.d.b. Refutation of the svasamvedanamatra theory [122.22-123.06]
II.1.1.2. Refutation of I.1.1.2.(Madhyamika's arguments) [123.09-128.25]
II.1.1.2.1. From the logical standpoint [123.08-17]
1. svatantranumana [123.09-11]
2. prasanganumana [123.11-15]
3. Using pervasion(vyapti) as accepted in another school [123.15-17]
II.1.1.2.2. From the ontological standpoint [123.17 - 126.01]
1. Polemics 1: samyoga(conjunction) of bamboo with wooden post [123.21 -124.02]
2. Polemics 2: That which is one and uniform exists in only one place.
(yad ekam tad ekatraiva vartate) [124.03-07]
3. Polimics 3: The avayava is not able to be a basis of the avayavin.[124.08-125.07]
4. Polemics 4: samavaya(inherence) [125.08-09]
5. Polemics 5: Standpoint of samanantarapratyaya(the immediately preceding homogeneous
cause) [125.09-126.01]
II.1.1.2.3. Polemics between the Sautrantikas and the Naiyayikas [126.01-128.25]
1. Cognizing A is not possible without cognizing B(tadagrahe 'grahat[126.01-11]
2. Army and wood(senavana) [126.11-20]
3. Net-like apparition(kesonduka) [126.20-127.07]
4. Distinction of class(jatibheda) [127.07-25]
5. The number of many-ness(bahutvasankhya) [127.26-128.25]
II.1.1.3. Refutation of I.1.1.2.2.1. [128.25-130.20]
II.1.1.3.1. The avayavin is nothing but the atoms [128.25 - 129.07]
II.1.1.3.2. The avayavin is only a particular conjunction (samyogavisesa)[129.7-130.14]
II.1.1.3.3. Village and audience are not the avayavins [130.15 - 20]
II.1.2. Refutation of I.1.3.(Denial of Atoms) [130.20 - 132.09]
II.1.2.1. Refutation of Vims k.12 [130.20 - 131.10]
II.1.2.1.1. Atoms should be inferred to exist from seeing their effects.[130.20-131.02]
II.1.2.1.2. Atoms have no parts. [131.03-05]
II.1.2.1.3. Mahat(grossness) should be inferred to occur when atoms are accumulating. [131.06-09]
II.1.2.2. Refutation of Vims k.14 ab and NS 4.2.18-19 [131.11-132.09]
II.1.2.2.1. Vims k.14 ab [131.11-19]
II.1.2.2.2. NS 4.2.18-19 [132.02-09]
II.2. Refutation of I.2.(The Vijnaptimatravadins' theory of knowledge)[132.09-154.20]
II.2.1. Refutation of I.2.1.(svasamvedana--- PVin I k.38) [132.09]
II.2.2. Refutation of I.2.2-3.(vijnaptimatrata)[132.11-141.30]
II.2.2.1. Refutation of sahopalambhaniyama(PVin I k.55ab)[132.11 - 133.21]
II.2.2.1.1. saha(together)=samanakale(at the same time) [132.12-133.07]
1. anaikantika(inconclusive) [132.12-14]
2. viruddha(incompatible) [132.14-133.07]
II.2.2.1.2. saha=eka(one and the same) [133.07-21]
1. saha=ekena purusena(by one and the same person) [133.07-08]
2. saha=ekasya(one and the same) [133.09-21]
2.1. ekasya jnanasya(one and the same knowledge) [133.10-12]
2.2. ekasyarthasya(one and the same thing) [133.13-14]
2.3. jnanarthayor ekasya(either a knowledge or a thing) [133.14-21]
II.2.2.2. Refutation of PVin I k.55 cd and PVin I 96,8-17 [133.21-135.25]
II.2.2.2.1. PVin I k.55cd [133.21-135.05]
apratyaksopalambhasya(a) narthadrstih prasiddhyate(b)
(a)(I%%%$B&A(B. arthadrsti, $B&B(B. tajjanakam jnanam
(b)(I%%%(BA. utpatti, B. upalabdhi
1. $B&A(BA [134.03-06]
2. $B&B(BA [134.06-09]
3. $B&A(B/$B&B(BB [134.09-11]
4. drsti=artha [134.11-135.02]
5. The Naiyayika's view [135.02-05]
II.2.2.2.2. PVin I 96,8 - 17 [135.06-25]
(I)na hi visayasattaya visayopalambhah,kim tarhi,tadupalambhasattaya/
(II)sa capramaniki na sattanibandhanan vyavaharan anurunaddhi/
1. The latter part (II) [135.09-15]
2. The former part (I) [135.15-25]
II.2.2.3. Polemics on svasamvedana(self-cognition) [135.26-141.14]
II.2.2.3.1. Knowledge can illuminate things other than itself.[135.26-136.11]
1. The eyes (caksus) do not cognize themselves. [136.02-03]
2. The heat (tejas) is the cause of illumination. [136.03-04]
3. The fire (agni) burns things without burning itself. [136.04-11]
II.2.2.3.2. Memory is not the case of sahopalambhaniyama. [136.13-137.02]
II.2.2.3.3. Knowledge is established without the svasamvedana theory. [137.04-22]
1. Knowledge is settled to be innate. [137.05-13]
2. Its own nature (svabhava) of knowledge can not be lost even if the svasamvedana
theory is denied. [137.15-20]
3. The relation of the assisting and the assisted (upakaryopakarakabhava) is not
approved. [137.21-22]
II.2.2.3.4. Denial of knowledge's nature of illuminating itself (svaprakasakatva) [137.24-139.18]
1. Examining paksadharma(i.e.svaprakasakatva) [138.01-39.13]
2. Examining the hetu "prakasakatva"(illuminating) [139.13-18]
II.2.2.3.5. Syllogism proving that knowledge is known by another knowledge [139.20 - 28]
II.2.2.3.6. Supplementary argument on sahopalambhaniyama [140.01-141.14]
1. Is sahopalambhaniyama established without anvayavyatirekabhava?[140.02]
2. Is it established by anvayavyatirekabhava?[140.02-141.14]
2.1. The refutation of grahyagrahaka(the cognizer and the cognitum).[140.07-19]
2.2. The refutation of adhyavasaya(the determination).[140.21-141.14]
II.2.2.4. Summary [141.14-30]
II.2.2.4.1. Conclusion [141.14-16]
II.2.2.4.2. Summary slokas [141.17-30]
II.2.2.4.3. Refutation of PVin I kk.39-40 and confirmation of the Naiyayika's
nirakarajnanavada [142.02-10]
II.2.2.5. The Buddhist doctrine of niralambanavada (the view that cognitions
have no reality as their corresponding objects) and Bhasarvajna's refutation [142.12-154.20]
II.2.2.5.1. The Buddhist(Prajnakaragupta) anumana of niralambanavada [142.12-18]
sarve pratyaya niralambanah pratyayatvat svapnadipratyayavat.
II.2.2.5.2. Bhasarvajna's refutation [142.19-154.20]
1. The reason is inconclusive(anaikantika).[142.19-143.11]
2. Niralambanavada leads to unestablishment of anumana.[143.11-144.23]
3. The reason is incompatible(viruddha).[144.23-145.13]
4. Examination of drstanta [145.15-148.03]
4.1. Paramarthasat and Samvrtisat [145.15-146.05]
4.1.1. Prajnakaragupta's view [145.15-146.01]
4.1.2. Bhasarvajna's refutation [146.02-05]
4.2. Pramanabhasa [146.07-148.03]
4.2.1. Prajnakaragupta's denial of pramanabhasa [146.08-147.05]
4.2.2. Bhasarvajna's refutation [147.06-148.03]
5. Examination of paksadharma "niralambanatva" [148.04-25]
6. Distinction between knowledge and object is known by perception.[148.25-149.03]
7. The Budhist view of alambana denied [149.04-150.04]
8. Rejection of objects of dreams shows that knowledge and its objects are different.[150.06-27]
9. Intense, fixed latent impression (drdhavasana) and weak, unfixed latent
impression (adrdhavasana) denied [150.27-151.17]
10. The fact that one object is seen by many people proves that knowledge
and its object are different.[151.18-28]
11. Other person's mind (santanantara) and impression (samskara) of previous
experience [152.02-20]
12. Rejection of Buddhist latent impression (vasana) theory [152.20-154.18]
II.2.2.3. The end of discussion.[154.18-20]
CHAPTER 3
Bhasarvajna's Refutation of the Buddhist Yogic Perception and their Doctrine
of Perception(pratyaksa)(---p.171,l.11 - p.173,l.8 ; p.176,l.11 - p.187,l.6---)
I. The yogic perception(yogipratyaksa) [171.11-173.08]
I.1. The Buddhist theory of yogic perception [171.11-172.06]
I.2. Bhasarvajna's refutation [172.08-173.08]
II. The nonyogic perception [176.11-187.06]
II.1. The Buddhist theory of nonyogic perception [176.11-180.20]
II.1.1. The Buddhist definition of the nonyogic perception [176.11-14]
II.1.2. The meaning of the term "avisamvadi" [176.15-177.11]
II.1.2.1. The thought of five-fold conceptual construction(vikalpa) and the Buddhist
view against it [176.15-24]
II.1.2.2. Denial of nondeterminate false cognitions(bhranti) from true perception [177.01 - 11]
II.1.2.3. "abhranta" and Dignaga [177.12-178.08]
II.1.3. The meaning of the paragraph "being free from conceptual construction(kalpanapodha)"
[178.09-180.20]
II.1.3.1. "kalpanapodha" is established by self-cognition(svasamvedana)[178.09-15]
II.1.3.2. Rejection of determinate perception(savikalpakapratyaksa) [178.16-180.14]
II.1.3.2.1. The ability of the object [178.19-179.06]
II.1.3.2.2. Memory cutting in between a sense organ and perception [179.07-17]
II.1.3.2.3. The determiner(visesana), the determined(visesya) and the like should
be denied from perception. [179.17-180.14]
II.1.4. Reconfirmation of the Buddhist definition of perception [180.14-20]
II.2. Bhasarvajna's refutation [180.22-187.06]
II.2.1. Avoiding the repeated arguments [180.22-23]
II.2.2. Bhasarvajna's refutation of II.1.3.2.(Buddhist rejection of determinate perception)
[180.23-187.06]
II.2.2.1. Refutation of II.1.3.2.1.(ability of the object) : the Naiyayika's way of
apprehending the object [180.23-182.12]
II.2.2.2. Refutation of II.1.3.2.2.(memory cutting in) : Memory as a co-operator [182.13-183.09]
II.2.2.3. Refutation of II.1.3.2.3.(the determiner, the determined and the like should
be removed from perception.) : the Naiyayika's view of determinate perception [183.10-187.06]
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Last modified: Wed Jan 9 16:36:04 JST 2002