Studies of Nyayabhusana(8)
                Bhasarvajna's Refutation of the Mimamsakas' Pramanya-
                              vada(Theory of Truth)

                                                         Shodo    YAMAKAMI
                                  (Summary)

     The Naiyayikas maintain that a cognition arising out of a collocation of
causal conditions is in itself neutral to truth and falsity. Truth and falsity
of a cognition is not produced by the same conditions that give rise to the
cognition itself, but produced by some additional factors such as karanagunas
(excellences of conditions) and karanadosas (defects of conditions) respectively.
And in order to ascertain truth of a cognition, a cognizer is required to take
action toward its object to obtain it. Truth of a cognition is ascertained by
a subsequent inference following such a practical behavior. Thus, according to
the Naiyayikas, not only in origination of truth of cognition, but also in its
ascertainment,  some other factors than cognition itself$B!!(Bshould be required,
which leads to the view that truth of cognition as well as its falsity is
extrinsic (paratah).
     The Mimamsakas, who insist on eternity and superhumanity of Veda sentenses,
sharply oppose the above-mentioned view of the Naiyayikas. According to the
Mimamsakas' view, there can not be any defect in Veda sentenses because they are
not man-made,  which means all cognitions aquired from Veda sentenses should be
utterly true.  But if there is  any defect in a listener's sense organ, i.e. a
productive factor of   the cognition, then truth of Veda sentenses can not be
transferred to the listener because of that defect, which means falsity of the
listener's cognition is due to some other conditions than cognition itself.
     In the Mimamsakas' epistemology, such a theory of truth of cognition from
Veda sentenses is applied to other kinds of cognitions,i.e. perceptive cognition
(pratyaksa), inferencial cognition (anumana)  etc. That is, any cognition does
not require any other factors than itself to be true when it originates, for it
should be always true when it  does originate. And a true cognition, after its
origination, can make itself known by its existence, which means it is ascertained
to be  true. In other words, a true cognition does not require any other factors
than itself to ascertain its truth. While in both cases of origi-nation and
ascertainment, falsity requires other factors than cognition such as defects of
causes. The Mimamsakas thus mainatain that truth  is intrinsic and falsity is
extrinsic.
     This paper consists of a Japanese summary and translation of the pramanyavada
(theory of truth) section of NBhus.,  where Bhasarvajna,  based on his Naiyayikas'
standpoint, refutes  the above-mentioned Mimamsakas' pramanyavada (mainly, that
of Kumarila Bhatta).

$B-5(B Kumarila's View --svatah pramanya(intrinsic truth) and paratah  apramanya
   (extrinsic falsity)-- [38.19 - 39.12]
1. In case of cognition's origination(utpatti) [39.01 - 09]
2. In case of cognition's functioning(pravvtti) [39.09 - 10]
3. In case of cognition's ascertainment(jnapti) [39.10 - 12]

$B-6(B Bhasarvajna's Refutation [39.14 - 43.14]
1. In case of cognition's origination(utpatti) [39.14 - 27]
2. In case of cognition's functioning(pravvtti) [40.01 - 09]
3. In case of cognition's ascertainment(jnapti) [40.09 - 43.14]
 a.Syllogism of paratah pramanya [40.09 - 10]
 b.Utsarga and apavada [40.11 - 41.13]
 c.Dosajnanabhava leads to anavastha. [41.13 - 42.10]
 d.Pramana arises from aniscayarthatvam. [42.10 - 43.06]
 e.Sharp impression [43.06 - 14]

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