Bhasarvajna's Explanation of the false Knowledge
                              (Summary)
                                　　　　　　　　　Shodo YAMAKAMI

      NS, the most fundamental literature of the Nyaya School, states that
   the true knowledge, which is explained to be a synonym for the
   removal of the false knowledge, regarding 16 logical topics as well
   as regarding the objects of knowledge (prameya) such as atman
   etc. can lead to the attainment of emancipation. Now that such is
   declared in NS it is inevitably important for the Naiyayika
   Bhasarvajna to investigate the nature of the false knowledge.
      In his examination Bhasarvajna focuses on two points as follows.
      At first, he presents us with various views regarding the object of
   the false knowledge, a discussion which is generally known as
   Khyativada. Khyativada literally means "discussion on knowledge," but
   somehow it comes that the term is employed to mean "discussion on
   knowledge in case of an illusion or an error." For example, the
   knowledge of "water" arising from seeing mirage is described as "the
   knowledge (khyati) regarding non-existent (asat)[water]"
   (asatkhyati). VV of Mandanamisra (ca. 8 century according to 
   Schmithausen, p.216) is regarded as the first which discussed this 
   problem as "Hauptthema"(Schmithausen, p.1 in Vorwort) and referred to 
   various khyatis, i.e. "khyativada". Since then many scholars followed 
   him in an effort to prove their own superiority over other schools.
      As for the Naiyayikas, Uddyotakara, of course, examined the nature of
   the false knowledge in detail to make the way for the Naiyayika
   theory. But the term "khyativada" was not known to him. It is
   noticeable in this respect that many pages are devoted to
   "khyativada" in NM of Jayanta. It is therefore supposed that
   sometimes in about three hundred years between Uddyotakara and
   Jayanta, some Naiyayikas, probably being stimulated by Mandanamisra,
   picked up this topic to discuss. It is also noteworthy that
   Bhasarvajna, usually being regarded to be traditionally close to
   Jayanta, is supposed to have some differrent sources from Jayanta
   regarding this topic.
      Secondly, Bhasarvajna, quoting from TUS, refutes the nihilistic
   Carvaka view that neither falsity nor non-falsity of knowledge is
   known to us. In the course of his discussion Bhasarvajna focuses on
   the cognition of non-falsity to maintain that non-falsity can be
   known through conformity with another knowledge, an assertion which
   is none other than the extrinsic truth (paratahpramanya) theory ---
   the theory that truth of cognition is extrinsic --- of the
   Naiyayikas. Here we realise Bhasarvajna's strategy that he tactfully
   makes good use of the discussions with the Carvakas to refute
   Mimamsaka Kumarila's intrinsic truth (svatahpramanya) theory --- the
   theory that truth of cognition is intrinsic.
      The following is an analysis of the text.

   1  Definition of the false knowledge(viparyaya)[25.07-25.19]
   2  Factors which bring forth the false knowledge[25.19-26.07]
   3  Discussing the object of the false knowledge[26.08-32.13]
    (0)Mentioning eight views regarding the false knowledge[26.08-11]
    (1)Suggestion of the akhyati theory[26.13-18]
    (2)Refutation of the akhyati theory followed by suggestion of the
       asatkhyati theory[27.01-10]
    (3)Refutation of the asatkhyati theory followed by suggestion of the
       prasiddharthakhyati theory[27.12-19]
    (4)Refutation of the prasiddharthakhyati theory followed by suggestion
       of the alaukikarthakhyati theory[27.21-28.02]
    (5)Refutation of the alaukikarthakhyati theory followed by suggestion
       of the smrtipramosa theory[28.03-13]
    (6)Refutation of the smrtipramosa theory followed by suggestion of the
       atmakhyati theory[28.15-29.19]
     (i)Refutation of the smrtipramosa theory[28.15-29.19]
     (ii)Suggestion of the atmakhyati theory[29.21-30.22]
    (7)Refutation of the atmakhyati theory followed by suggestion of the
       anirvacaniyakhyati theory[30.24-31.19]
     (i)Refutation of the atmakhyati theory[30.24-31.06]
     (ii)Suggestion of the anirvacaniyakhyati theory[31.08-19]
    (8)Refutation of the anirvacaniyakhyati theory followed by suggestion
       of the　viparitakhyati theory of the Naiyayikas[31.21-32.13]
   4  Discussions on the object of the dream-cognition[32.15-33.15]
   5  Discussions on cognising the falsity(bhrantitva) and the
      non-falsity(abhrantitva) [33.17-38.17]
    (1)Carvaka view : neither the falsity nor the non-falsity cognised
       [33.17-34.14]
     (i)The falsity never cognised[33.17-23]
      (a)The falsity not cognised through perception(pratyaksa)
      (b)Nor cognised through inference(anumana)
     (ii)The non-falsity never cognised[33.23-34.14]
      (a)Being produced by faultless causes is not an inferential
         mark(linga).
      (b)Nor is the non-arising of sublation an inferential mark.
      (c)Nor the efficiency of the activity.
    (2)Bhasarvajna's refutation of the above argumentation of Carvakas
       [34.16-38.17]
     (i)Cognition of falsity[34.16-36.17]
      (a)Refuting that the falsity is never cognised[34.16-35.13]
      (b)Proving that the falsity is cognised[35.13-36.17]
     (ii)Cognition of non-falsity[36.18-38.17]
      (a)Approving that being produced by fautless causes is not linga
      (b)Refuting that the non-arising of sublation is not linga
         [36.19-37.16]
      (c)Refuting that the efficiency of the activity is not linga
         [37.16-38.17]